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Traditionally, the financial regulation it used to structure itself on the basis of 
specialized organizations, each one responsible to supervise the intermediaries 
by the type of activity that was carried out. The  current  trend is  toward  an 
integrated model that reunite in one or two organizations the different functions 
that previously were responsibility of diverse specialized authorities.  
 
The discussion with respect the advantages and disadvantages of adopting an 
integrated model of supervision is relatively recent although non new. In spite of 
the decisions  about  completely integrate the regulation in the Scandinavian 
countries was part of an initiated evolutionary process that began at middle of 
80´ s Unlike what it happened in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the proposal 
made by the Wallis Committee to reform the organizational structure of financial 
regulation in Australia gave rise an intense discussion between government and 
regulated institutions.  As result of this, the Australian government  adopted a 
scheme of twin peaks by mean that the regulation is handle only by two 
authorities, on that consolidates  the prudential regulation and other that 
consolidate all conduct of business regulation. Some of the most intensive debate 
with respect to this subject was in the United Kingdom, from the proposal of 
reform present by the Ministry of Treasure and that finally concluded with the 
creation of the Financial Services Authority.  
 
The debate between governments, financial intermediaries, and academic have 
put in clear that the dispersion and duplicity of regulatory jurisdiction, a overlap 
and often  confused  normative  frame,  and the lack of coordination and 
cooperation among the diverse agencies, are some of the deficiency in the model 
dispersed of supervision. Some countries are prime cases for a reform of the 
financial  regulation  institutional organization  in order to encourage the 
development and efficiency of the financial entities without put in risk the safety 
and soundness of the financial systems. 
 
From the modern theory of economic regulations it is possible to assess a 
regulatory regimen by how close is to address the market failures on the market 
supposed to regulated and how minimal is the social cost it imposed over its 
regulated entities and the market as a whole. The market failures characteristic 
in financial markets comes from asymmetric information phenomenal.  
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The recent evolution in the financial markets, guided by innovation and 
liberalization, requires a regulator high efficient in a regulatory task intensive in 
information coordination cross multiple financial product lines inside a highly 
integrated financial groups in a rising competitive environment. 
 
A regulatory regime of fragmented supervisory authorities increases the risk of 
regulatory failures therefore not always capable to exploit the economies of scale 
and scope in a regulatory task intensive in opportune information gathering and 
processing, also exposed to regulatory forbearance and becoming interest groups 
by themselves. In fact, becoming each regulator a monopoly over its regulated 
entities, creating  rents by protecting a turf of captive supervisory powers 
incompatible and unsynchronized with each other. Therefore, incrementing the 
cost of regulation. 
 
The reform toward a single regulator finds its objectives in obtaining economies 
of scale and scope in the vertical integration of specific unambiguous regulatory 
objectives. In a way similar to the integration of successive monopolies in order 
to avoid double or triple marginalization o f  monopoly rents over a single 
processes. Economies in the information gathering and processing are guided to 
efficient regulation in an independent institutional framework to avoid regulatory 
failures. The experience in this reform is recent in the cases of Australia, Japan 
and Korea after the UK and Scandinavian experience. 
 
Considering the cost of regulation as a fixed cost on each domestic financial 
market. An efficient setting would be a low fixed cost relative to a high sized 
financial market.  The relative performance efficiency between the multiple 
regulatory agencies model and the single regulator model is empirically an open 
question, despite of the international spread of the single model in the last 
decade in more than ten countries. In cases like the United States and Canada 
the multiple agencies and double layer (at federal and state level) regulatory 
model does not clearly implies a costly obstacle to its financial markets growth 
and evolution. However, low income countries with severe underdeveloped 
financial markets and costly multiple authorities scheme calls for a prime 
candidates to reform its financial regulatory. Using indicators from supervisory 
cost and financial activity size, Mexico appears to be the economy with the 
highest fixed cost in an underdeveloped or small size financial activity relative to 
the GDP therefore, it means a highly inefficient regulatory organization. Urgent 
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1.  Supervising Financial Intermediaries: A complex dance between 
innovation and regulation. 
 
Financial institutions provide payment services and a variety of products that 
enable the corporate sector and households to cope with economic uncertainties 
by hedging, pooling, sharing and pricing risks. A stable and efficient financial 
sector reduces the costs and risk of investment and trade of goods and services. 
Financial markets provide a n important  source of information that helps to 
coordinate the decentralization of decisions within the economy. Rates of returns 
in financial markets guide households in allocating income between consumption 
and savings, and in allocating their stock of wealth. Firms rely on financial 
markets prices to inform their choices among investment projects and to 
determine how such projects should be financed. Nowadays the financial services 
are experiencing an era of rapid innovations, characterized by the development 
of two technologies, data processing and telecommunications, which are at the 
heart of the financial services and its competitive environment. 
 
The underlying technologies of finance, data processing and telecommunications, 
have becoming dramatically more powerful and less costly on almost daily basis. 
These improved technologies have allowed to innovate and improve the 
management and processing of data, assess risks, and t hereby design new 
products and services, often using convergent services, and mixing traditional 
products in order to offer on new ones (e.g. banking and insurance) that can 
better meet the financial demands of individuals and firms. Moreover, these 
products and services can be offered across wide geographic areas. The 
securitization of many categories of previously illiquid assets, most notably, real 
estate mortgages and credit card receivables are good illustrations of these 
developments. 
 
In the financial markets, as other regulated sectors, inevitably coexist regulation 
and innovation, a complex and often socially costly relationship. Innovation 
consists of firms’ developing new products or services and/or new production 
processes. Often, but not always, the new products are based on new processes; 
sometimes also new organizations and organizational innovations, are involved. 
Innovation in products and processes, are not new to the financial services 
sector. Firms in the various sub-sectors of finance have a long history of new 
instruments and services and of developing improved “back office”  processes to 
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The  appearance of new  financial products (e.g. derivatives)  has implied  new 
complexity levels with respect to the  traditional  financial  products.  Financial 
product innovation implied greater  complexity, and often, their greater 
leveraging possibilities open new opportunities for risk-taking,  their  broad 
utilization involve new informational requirements to individual investors, also the 
managers of financial intermediaries pose great prudential regulatory concerns 
(i.e. banks and other depositories, insures companies etc.) because the use of 
these instruments as part of a deliberate risk-increasing strategy increase. 
 
Markets liberalization policies toward the direction of less restrictions and 
protectionism, have r einforced these technological improvements, yielding 
heightened levels of competition throughout the financial services sector. In turn, 
these greater competitive pressures have forced incumbent to find improved and 
less costly ways of providing financial services, and deregulation has made it 
easier for innovations to enter these markets. The users of financial services 
have more choices and opportunities over wider geographic areas, including the 
opportunities to make mistakes; the incumbent purveyors of financial services 
face more competition. Inevitably, this rapid change, urge incumbents to 
successfully adapt, other will falter, merge or possibly fail, the competitive 
pressures do rise a set of regulatory concerns because financial failure among 
the financial intermediaries increase and, therefore, the task of typical financial 
regulation become more complex. At present time it is difficult to separate 
market-derived risk from traditional banking risk, at the same time banking and 
insurance tend to converge. 
 
It seems possible to have an increase in competition coupled with a reduction of 
insolvency risk via improving diversification, via consolidation, as an outcome of 
the liberalization process. Size provides the potential of exploiting scale 
economies from overhead in administrative and back-office operations, 
information technologies, and in investment-banking type operations related to 
information gathering and fund management. 
 
Also size may help in archive scope economies, of combining different products 
lines because increases the relationship value and decreased averaging 
marketing costs, also such economies exist between commercial and investment 
banking. Consequently, the distinction between commercial banks, securities 
firms, insurance companies and other financial institutions has become blurred,  
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and large diversified financial conglomerates have been created that span the 




2 has focused on assessment of the quality of 
the bank’s balance sheet and loans at a point in time and then determines 
whether the bank complies with capital requirements and restrictions on assets 
holdings. Because this kind of prudential supervision is based on regulatory rules, 
it is referred as a pure regulatory approach based in the one-size-fits-all model. 
However, the traditional approach is no longer adequate in which financial 
innovation has produced new markets and instruments that make it easy for 
banks to make huge beats easily and quickly. In this new financial environment, 
a bank that is quite healthy at a particular point in time can be driven into failure 
extremely rapidly from trading losses. 
 
The safety and soundness scrutiny of banks regulators should be strengthened in 
a period of rapid innovation, market concentration coupled with heightened 
competitive pressures, may lead to take high risks at the expense of depositors 
or deposit insurers. New policies toward the safety and soundness regulatory 
instruments include better ways of measuring capital (i.e. market value 
accounting framework) and of measuring risk (e.g. financial stress tests). This 
change in financial environment has resulted in a major shift toward a 
supervisory forward looking approach where the regulator focus less on 
compliance with specific regulatory rules and the risk of the financial instruments 
currently in the bank’s portfolio and more on the soundness of the bank’s 
management practices with regard to controlling risk. More recently, emphasis is 
added to reinforced supervision by disclosure requirements in order to increase 
transparency and foster market discipline, as well as allowing banks to relay on 
their own internal models to assess and control risk. 
 
This represents a move from r igid to flexible view of capital  requirements
3. 
Supervisors will have to assess as efficiently as possible how well banks are 
                                                   
1 International Monetary Fund, “ International Capital Markets 1999. Annex IV”. 
2  Traditionally prudential supervision has i ts origin in the impossibility of the users by 
themselves to judge the safety and soundness of the financial institutions that operates in the 
market. This impossibility is come loose from the imperfection in the information received 
by the users, the problems related to the moral hazard and the asymmetric information, as 
well as the fact that the later behavior of the intermediaries, to the date of hiring or buys, 
affect the initial value of subscribe contracts and acquired products.  
3 The 1999 New Basel Capital Accord advances three pillars: minimum capital requirements, 
supervision and market discipline, allowing banks to choose from a menu of approaches to 
measure risk.  
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matching their capital to the risk assumed and disclose information on their 
capital structure, accounting practices, risk exposures and capital adequacy in a 
timely manner. In summary, capital requirements plus efficient supervision and 
market discipline are main factors to maintain sound financial system
4.   
 
Regulation also can be a hindrance to innovation, and actual or prospective 
innovation may be a precursor to subsequent regulation. The social welfare 
consequences of these complex interactions, and the implications for the 
development of public policy, are themselves a task to regulators, but an 
understanding of the processes of innovation and of regulation can clarify the 
interactions and thus help to structure the public policy debate.  
 
The  economic  rationale for the regulation of financial intermediaries  requires 
being  point out  in order to understand the need of an efficient regulation. 
Financial intermediaries are firms that hold financial assets (e.g. loans, 
mortgages, bonds, equity securities) and issue liabilities (such as deposits, 
insurance policies, pension obligations, mutual fund shares, etc.) on themselves 
thereby intermediating between their liability holders and the ultimate 
investments to which their liability holders’ funds have been allotted. However, 
this intermediation generates some substantial market failures that a proper 
regulation can minimize or preclude in order to have the proper market incentive 
to have and efficient market outcome. 
 
The rationale for regulation in a broad sense is the governmental intervention in 
the conduct of an array of economic agents in order to be a tool for correcting 
the shortcomings from market performance. These potential market failures 
include: a) the exercise of market power (monopoly); b) positive or negative 
externality effects; c) public goods phenomena; d) pervasive uncertainty; and e) 
asymmetric information among the parts of marketplace  traders. In an ideal 
setting, regulators would correct and prevent the imperfections of markets at the 
minimum cost. In financial intermediation, the source of market failures came 
from the substantial weight of debt in banks’ capital structure and the wide 
dispersion among small investors of this debt. The large amount of debt 
increases the risk of failure, while the dispersion on small investors limits their 
ability to monitor the activities of the banks. This implies that the banks have a 
                                                   
4 Vives, X. “Competition in the changing world of banking”, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 17, No. 4. 2001.  
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Further, the social cost of failure of banks is perceived to be large. This social 
cost includes the cost of financial and economic distress, the former are typically 
borne by the bank’s creditors and shareholders and hence internalized in their 
decisions. Other costs are negative externalities, such as the loss of informational 
capital and the destruction of fiduciary role between the public and financial 
entities, leading to the disruption of the payment system. 
 
The external effects, a typical market failure, come when a solvent bank may be 
subject to a purely speculative panic, depositors withdrawing the funds and the 
bank being force to liquidate assets quickly at a high cost due to the excess of 
supply of assets generates a fall in its price. The systemic risk owing to contagion 
from the failure of an entity, which may give rise to a strong negative externality 
both for the financial sector and for the real sector of the economy. Market 
devices to generate information and to internalize the cost of risk assumption are 




Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort have been put in place precisely 
to face the potential fragility of the financial system. Those facilities may 
compound the moral-hazard problem. Fragility, severe moral-hazard problem and 
failure has been associated w ith a large social cost, typically of a systemic 
                                                   
5 A crucial market failure in the financial system is asymmetric information in which one 
party to a financial contract has substantially less accurate information than the other party. 
Asymmetric information leads to two b asic problems in the financial system: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection in an asymmetric information problem that 
occurs before the transaction occurs because lower quality borrowers with high credit risk are 
the ones who are most willing to take out a loan and pay the highest interest rate. Thus, the 
parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable outcome are the most likely to be 
selected. Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place because the lender is subjected 
to the hazard that the borrower has incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable to 
the lender, the borrower has incentives to shift into high risk in which the borrower does well 
if succeeds but the lender bears most of the loss if fails. In banking the moral hazard come 
from high enforcement cost to the public that make too costly to prevent moral hazard in 
loans funded with depositors resources even with a fully informed bank. 
6 The systemic effects suppose and deep asymmetric information between the public and the 
banks. Leaving the system vulnerable to runs, the subordinated debt may be efficient as a risk 
sharing and/or as an incentive mechanism, because subordinated debt is uninsured debt that is 
junior to insurance deposits, but senior to  equity. When information is growing from the 
market a run can also be brought on by information regarding bank solvency, and it may have 
a disciplinary effects on the assumption of risk by financial entities.  
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nature, such phenomena are the justification of regulation as an answer to these 
potential and costly market failures. However, the regulation must be right to 
prevent such a costs and in an efficient, at minimal social cost. 
 
Unfortunately governmental entities and also their regulatory processes, are full 
of imperfections as difficulties in formulating clear and implementable goals, in 
establishing incentives for efficiency, in dealing with problems from asymmetric 
information between regulators and the parties they are supposed to regulate 
and becoming themselves into interest groups subject to be bias in order to 
preserve authority and management. The result could well be inefficiencies that 
are at least as substantial as the market imperfections that the regulatory 
process was supposed to correct. With imperfections present in the regulatory 
processes, as well as in the market processes, there are no assurance of purity 
neither of motives in regulation nor of efficiency in criteria and outcomes. 
Innovation has become the main engine to impulse the needed reform of 
inefficient regulatory institutions. 
 
The fundamental policy is how these new instruments should be applied and by 
which kind of regulator. Nevertheless, bureaucratic rivalry over regulatory turf 
ought not be allowed to delay the delivery of the benefits and efficiencies of the 
new instruments. An important impediment to successful prudential supervision 
of the financial system is the principal-agent problem in which the agent (a set of 
regulators or supervisors) does not have the same incentives as the principal 
(the legislative representation) and so act in their own interest rather than in the 
interest of the principal. 
 
Because of the principal-agent problem, regulators have incentives to do the 
opposite and engage in regulatory forbearance
7. Incentives to hide insolvent 
banks, because poor performance, characterizes  “bureaucratic gambling”  with 
the objective of minimize political cost for loose supervision in answer to close 
relationship between political cycles and the regulatory staff. This phenomenon is 
avoidable limiting the principal-agent problem by making supervisors accountable 
if they engage in regulatory forbearance. Market based supervision and opening 
up the actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny makes regulatory 
                                                   
7 Regulatory forbearance leaves insolvent entities operating which increases moral hazard 
incentives to take on excessive risk because an operating but insolvent institution has almost 
nothing to lose by taking on colossal risk.  
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Supervision of the global financial system  still largely fragmented both 
functionally and geographically, while global financial markets are becoming 
increasingly integrated. The innovation trend is causing the markets for some 
financial products and services to widen beyond national boundaries, therefore 
there are calls for and efforts at international harmonization of financial 
regulation to improve supervision both across functional lines and borders. These 
efforts have gone the farthest in banking, followed by securities and then 
insurance. The gains that come from harmonization of information regulation 
(e.g. in standardizing accounting framework and reporting requirements) reduce 
transaction costs of both, the purveyors and users of financial services. 
 
2. Reforming Institutions in  Financial Supervision. Toward a Single 
Financial Regulator. 
 
The current financial environment is leading the innovation on the regulators 
institutional framework. The t raditional model where the supervision is 
performed over each single category of financial intermediary and assigned to a 
distinct agency, each intermediary and market has only one supervisory authority 
as a counterpart is being phase out because fast pace innovation, and the 
regulation institutions are lagged behind from the market evolution. 
  
Traditional model has been rise, in the presence of entities entitled to perform a 
convergent financial intermediation activities, to costly distortions in the 
supervisory activity caused by the enforcement of different dispositions for 
operations of the same nature that are executed by different entities. The 
disadvantages of this approach are increasing by the progressive despecialization 
of the intermediaries, related to the growing integration of both markets and 
instruments or products, common to the financial conglomerates. 
 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) have demonstrated from a sample of 107 
countries, at the end of the 1990’s decade, a lack of statistical link between bank 
performance and official supervision. Specifically, the supervisory power is not 
related to the claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as a share of 
GDP or bank efficiency measured by interest margins and overhead cost or the 
level of non-performing loans. In sum, those features of official core supervision 
                                                   
8 Mishkin, Frederic S., “Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in 
Emerging market Countries”, NBER, Working Paper 8087, January 2001.  
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are not strongly linked to bank development and efficiency
9. This empirical 
evidence supports the reform of the regulatory instruments and the reform of the 
supervisory institutional organization. 
 
At the begin of 2002 a single financial regulators outside the central bank are set 
in UK (1998), Australia (1998), Denmark (1988), Norway (1986) Sweden (1991), 
Iceland (2001), Japan (2000), Korea (1998), Hungary (2000), Latvia (2001) and 
Estonia (2002). Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, South Africa and Switzerland 
are known to be considering the potential merits of a similar move. The trend is 
clear, fewer central banks are now responsible for banking supervision and new 
supervisors are been created to regulate a wide variety of financial institutions 
and services from one agency. 
 
In opposite, countries in which regulatory framework is characterized by the 
operation of several financial regulators, each intermediary is subject to the 
regulatory tools of more than one authority with specific assignment of 
competencies and the result is not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in 
practice. Therefore, the way the regulatory instruments are set up to the 
regulated entities may become a destabilizing factor because different authorities 
might have overlapping instruments or with objectives potentially in conflict with 
each other. Therefore the intermediaries may have to justify the same action to 
a whole set of authorities contemporaneously, even though different reasons, 
leading to a deficit of efficient controls because the exact areas of supervisions 
are not clearly identifiable in specific cases. 
 
Competition between supervisors actually induces laxity into r egulation 
performance, especially if financial institutions can choose whom they are 
supervised by because the intermediaries might be induced to choose their legal 
status in a way, which is, contingent on the different rules that discipline or 
supervise different entities, as a strategy in order to save cost of compliance. In 
fact each supervisory authority become an interest group competing for funding 
by competing to regulate as a broad set of entities as possible. The incentives 
generated hinder an efficient risk-based approach to regulation and to resource 
allocation.  
 
The single-regulator supervisory model is not just based on one control authority 
with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries. This authority would be 
concerned with all the  objectives of regulation in an efficient framework of 
                                                   
9 Barth, James R., Caprio, Gerard, and Levine, Ross “Bank Regulation and Supervision: 
What Works Best?” mimeo World Bank, August 2001.  
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independence and incentives. In the regulatory practice, the centralized 
supervisory model has typically characterized early stages of financial system 
development, often in periods when the central bank was the only institution that 
supervised the activity of financial intermediaries. 
 
In recent times, because fast pace innovation and deregulation, the English 
brought this model back into being with the creation of the Financial Services 
Authority
10, l eading to a more efficient organization of regulatory activities 
including a reduction in the costs of regulation itself. In addition, it was 
considered useful to have just one agency accountable to the Parliament and to 
the market. 
 
The advantages of the single regulator approach lie mainly in the economies of 
scale and scope that it produces. A fixed cost and logistical expenses with a 
unified management structure; and a unified approach to standard setting, 
authorization and enforcement generate decreasing average cost per supervision 
operation
11. Conglomerates and groups operating in a variety of financial 
activities do not require a proliferation of supervisory units.   
 
The economies of scope come from synergies between the roles of prudential 
supervisors of different financial activities, there are increasing need for them to 
co-operate among each other to improve their understanding of the overall 
financial supervision. This increasing need for co-operation and co-ordination 
justify the establishment of a single prudential supervision on the grounds of 
effectiveness in setting standards for regulated firms, the analysis about the 
status of individual entities and market wide issues and a considerably more 
effective way to contribute and adopt international co-operation than when the 
regulatory responsibilities are split between multiple authorities. 
 
The economies of scale and scope from the unified regulator approach generate 
a cost savings to the regulated entities, particularly with respect to multi-
functional groups or conglomerates.  The costs of supervision charged to the 
subjects regulated and/or to the public finances decreases, and there is less 
                                                   
10 The British merged the pre-existing supervisory authorities, part of the Central Bank staff, 
the Securities Investment Board, the directorship of the Department of Trade and Industry 
competent in the insurance field and the Security Regulatory Organizations. However, the 
single-regulator model was first developed in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), 
a decade before. 
11 The experience in the UK is illustrative, the FSA is costing less, in real terms, between 
1998 and 2002 than the sum of the predecessors’ regulatory bodies and its budget fell in real 
terms in each of the four years from 1998/99 to 2001/02 (Financial services Authority, 2001).   
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room for  “regulatory arbitrage” , the social costs of the regulation is abated 
because a low transaction cost and resources waste in unsynchronized and 
redundant processes and information collection.  
 
However, the validity of this model depends of a clear definition of regulatory 
objectives to perform and procure a high degree of efficiency on its internal 
organization, if the areas of competence and specialization are not well-
structured and coordinated will be impossible to exploit the economies from the 
reform. There is a risk to slow the decision-making process and create 
excessively bureaucratic agency because the reform toward a single authority is 
only limited to the merging of a set of pre-existing regulators. 
 
The single authority model has the advantage to implement a clear set of 
incentives to ensure the minimization of such performance risk. A  policy of 
accountability for its performance against its statutory objectives, for the 
regulatory regime, for the cost of regulation and for the regulatory failures is 
easily to set in a single supervisory authority rather than inside a multiple and 
overlapping regulation regime, where no one internalize the cost of regulatory 
forbearance and capture.   
 
Other set of risks that can be minimized are: i) a unique regulator might render 
collusive relations with regulated entities more immediate and direct (“regulatory 
capture” ); ii) a single regulator outside the central bank mean information 
weakness from losing ability to directly exploit informational synergies from 
banking supervision in the process of monetary policy operations. The potential 
effect on information flow can be alleviated if there is sufficient and opportune 
coordination and information sharing between the supervisor and the central 
bank
12, and iii) effective banking supervision requires independence of political 
agenda. The independence gains from central banks guarantee the minimization 
of conflictive objectives or vicious role between lender-of-last-resort and effective 
supervision
13. If a single regulator outside the central bank mean loosing 
independence or starting from scratch before  political forces, the reform is 
meaningless. 
 
                                                   
12 In a survey of 123 countries in 1999, 72% of the sample prudential banking supervision is 
still the responsibility of the central bank (only few cases in the finance ministry as Mexico). 
At the end of 2001, in a larger sample of 143 countries, 69% of the cases the central bank is 
still supervising financial intermediaries. Central Banking Publications, 2002. 
13 In Mexico there prudential regulators in and out the Central Bank, with the outside 
regulators dependent from the Finance or Treasury Ministry.  
DEPARTAMENTO  
DE DERECHO      CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PRIVADO 
________________________________________________________________ 
Río Hondo 1, San Angel, C.P. 01000 México, D.F. Tels: 628.4000 exts. 4675, 3748 
Fax: 490-4678; E-mail: cueto@itam.mx , atinoco@itam.mx, rtovar@itam.mx 
15 
 
3. Financial Supervision Reform in the APEC Region. 
 
In the APEC region, there are three countries, which have implemented reforms 
toward a single financial authority or regulator outside its Central Bank: Australia, 




Australia.  Since July 1998, it adopted a twin peak model for its regulatory 
structure reform. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is an 
integrated prudential regulator responsible for deposit-taking institutions, life and 
general insurance, pension funds, and credit associations. The Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), a conduct of business regulator, 
setting and enforce standards for the financial market. These standards aim to 
provide market information and consumer protection and confidence. 
 
Japan.  Before 1998, the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the 
supervising t he financial system. Underneath it, the Bank of Japan and the 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission both played subsidiary roles. 
In June 1998, from a financial crisis, the Financial Supervisory Agency was 
separate from the Ministry to become a unitary regulator of all financial 
institutions. On July 2000, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) was created from 
the merger of the FSA and the Financial System Planning Bureau from the 
Ministry. Currently operates as a single regulator with broad powers over the 
supervision of financial intermediaries and the surveillance of securities 
transactions. 
 
Korea.  At the end of 1990’s, the Korea case illustrated the risks from 
fragmented supervision before a financial crisis. Lax prudential standards and 
supervisory forbearance were major deficiencies in the banking system. The 
Bank of Korea supervised commercial banks, but the Ministry of Finance 
supervised merchant banks. Defects in the soundness of banks were not 
immediately fix once detected by supervisors, and changes to prudential 
regulations were made to allow banks to report profits and capital positions that 
were misleading. Knowledge of such supervisory forbearance, together with less 
than fully transparent accounting, meant that banks were not encouraged to 
take speedy action to improve their solvency. On April 1998, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission was establish as an independent integrated financial 
                                                   
14 Courtis, Neil and  Milne, Alistair “Annual Survey of Supervisory Developments 2001/2”, 
Central Banking Publications 2001  
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supervisor and was create by consolidating four previous financial supervisory 
authorities. 
 
The rest of the counties in the APEC region have a traditional regulatory 
framework: multiple regulatory agencies inside and/or outside the central bank 
and/or the commerce, finance or treasure ministries
15. Remarkably complex 
cases are Canada and the United States; both have multiple regulators at federal 
and state level. The systems are complicated by the fact that many financial 
institutions can be incorporated at either state (provincial) or federal level, 
intermediaries incorporated at the federal level may be subjected to further 
regulation by state level supervisors in areas like standards and consumer 
protection. 
 
To have an estimation of the economic cost from a scheme of multiple regulators 
or supervisory entities to the financial systems is an extreme difficult task 
because there are several sources of inefficiencies in its regulatory performance. 
The cost associated to such inefficiencies range from overlapping red tape to 
staff time expenditures, multiple standards and asynchronous supervisory tasks 
to legal fees, expenses and penalizations across heterogeneous financial 
intermediaries. 
 
Using an international benchmarking, if the explicit cost of the regulated entities, 
budget and/or staff, is a fixed cost needed to the daily performance of the 
financial system. It is possible to assume that a less the magnitude of the fixed 
cost to running the system and bigger the size of the financial market, more 
efficient or less costly will be the financial transactions regulation or supervision. 
In others words, the scale economies will be more ample over the financial 
markets size
16. A trend toward a single supervisor lead to economies that 
generate a resources requirement growth rate less that size growth rate of the 
financial markets. An efficient scenario should have a high financial market size 
and a relative low fixed cost of regulation. 
 
Therefore, the indicators should be related to the financial market size and to the 
regulatory agencies cost (budget and staff) in order to figure out the size of the 
fixed cost incurred to running the financial system in each domestic market 
                                                   
15 Only Singapore has the complete regulatory authority over the overall financial system 
inside its central bank. 
16 When the scale is small, fixed cost per unit of scale is large. As scale increases fixed cost is 
spread over more unit of output and fixed cost per unit of output falls. The cost curve will be 
lower if the fixed cost is low and the operations scale is large.  
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economy. In order to get a measure of the financial transactions size the 
indicator must be close related to the public holdings of financial assets related 
to transactions regulated because their association with potential market failures, 
consistent with the regulation rationale. 
 
Frequently the indicator used is the Total Financial Assets, however the central 
bank assets inclusion made it non-necessarily appropriate to consider it. A prime 
candidate to the size measure is the Liquid Liabilities (currency plus demand and 
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) this is 
the broadest available indicator of financial intermediation. 
 
Liquid Liabilities is a typical measure of financial “depth”  and thus of the overall 
size of the financial sector, without distinguished between the financial sectors or 
between the use of liabilities
17. By aggregating the liquid liabilities of a broad 
range of banks and non-banks, Liquid Liabilities to GDP is a general indicator of 
the size of financial intermediaries relative to the size of the economy
18. Other 
indicators are partial and not close related to the market failures that justify 
regulation, Bank Assets to GDP provides a measure of the overall size of the 
banking sector and, by aggregating bank claims on the private sector, Claims of 
Deposit Money Banks on Private Sector to GDP is a general indicator bank 
activity in the private sector.  
  
From the data about cost and financial development indicators, extreme cases of 
underdeveloped or undersized financial markets with a high fixed cost of 
regulation are Mexico and Russia. Therefore, both countries have a relative 
inefficient financial supervisory organization under international benchmarking. 
People’s Republic of China and Russia are transition countries, evolving from a 
centrally planned to a market based economy; the institutional infrastructure and 
their financial markets are still in their genesis (see diagram 1 and 2). 
                                                   
17 Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Levine, Ross “A new database on financial 
development and structure”, mimeo World Bank. June 1999. 
18 As Levine (1999) M3 money definition is used when Liquid Liabilities in not available in 
certain countries.   
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  Financial Regulation Cost and Financial Market Size in selected 
APEC Countries (2000-01)
19 
  Regulation Cost Indicators  Financial Market Size 
Country  Budget 
(Millions USD) 
Staff  Liquid Liabilities / 
GDP 
Bank Assets / 
GDP 
Single Regulation Authority 
Australia  97.7  1,644  0.68  0.77 
Korea  117.0  1,510  0.76  0.55 
Japan  113.0  973  1.95  1.31 
Multiple Regulation Authorities 
Canada  101.4  1,592  0.77  0.66 
China  N.A.  23,646  1.12  N.A. 
Hong Kong  169.5  1,035  2,19  1.49 
Malaysia  26.0  631  1.35  0.82 
Mexico  257.8  2,372  0.25  0.24 
Philippines  1.2  1,304  0.60  0.40 
Russia  836.6  2,254  0.17  N.A. 
Thailand  7.9  884  1.17  0.82 
USA  2,223.7  13,871  0.70  0.73 
Source: Staff and Budget data from Courtis, Neil Ed. “How Countries Supervise 
theirs Banks, Insurers and Securities Market 2002” and Financial market indicators 
from IMF, International Financial Indicators 2000 to 2001. For Mexico the 
international data were complemented from ABM with SHCP (Treasury Ministry) 
information and regulators data: CONSAR and IPAB Annual Informs, CONDUSEF 
does not report its staff size.  
 
                                                   
19 Selected countries based in a supervisory staff above 500, that is the international average 
supervisory staff level.   
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The relative  performance  efficiency between the multiple  regulatory  agencies 
model and the single regulator model i s  empirically an open question to be 
address,  despite of the  international  spread of the  single model in the last 
decade in more than ten countries. In cases like the United States and Canada 
the multiple agencies and double layer (at federal and state level) regulatory 
model does not clearly implies a costly obstacle to its financial markets growth 
and  evolution. However,  low income  countries with  severe  underdeveloped 
financial  markets  and costly multiple authorities  scheme  calls for a prime 
candidates to reform its financial regulatory approach
20. 
   
In the Mexico case, the indicators calls for an urgent reforms in the very 
fundamentals of the regulation institutional framework.  Mexico combine the 
lowest financial market size and the more expensive and biggest supervisory 
staff in the APEC region, excluding the USA and transition economies (People’s 
Republic of China and Russia). As expected from indicators, its regulation 
institutional framework it highly inefficient. Mexico has a fragmented and 
overlapping financial supervisory authorities. It is a unique case where there are 
regulation authorities inside both, Central Bank and Finance or Treasure Ministry, 
and coexisting with non-independent decentralized supervisory agencies
21. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
From the modern theory of economic regulations it is possible to assess a 
regulatory regimen by how close is to address the market failures on the market 
supposed to regulated and how minimal is the social cost that the regulator 
impose over its regulated entities and the market as a whole.  
 
The market failures characteristic in financial markets  come from asymmetric 
information phenomenal. The recent evolution in the financial markets, guided by 
                                                   
20 According with Levine (2001), a severe under developed financial markets are countries 
with liquid liabilities to GNP ratio under 0.3 since the international mean is 0.6. Low and low 
to middle income are countries are under $3,000 USD.  
21 In México coexist seven financial regulators: 1) Inside Central Bank (Banco de México), 2) 
Inside Finance or Treasure Ministry (Subsecretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Pú blico, SHCP), 3) 
Banking and Securities Regulator (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, CNBV), 4) 
Insurance Regulator (Comisión Nacional de Seguros y  Fianzas, CNSF), 5) Financial 
Consumer Protection Regulator (Comisión Nacional  para la Protección y Defensa  de los 
Usuarios de Servicios Financieros, CONDUSEF), 6) Pension Funds Regulator (Comisión 
Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro, CONSAR,  7) Banking Deposit Insurance 
(Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario, IPAB).  
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innovation and liberalization, requires a regulator high efficient in a regulatory 
task intensive in information coordination cross multiple financial product lines 
inside a highly integrated financial groups in a rising competitive environment. 
 
A regulatory regime of fragmented supervisory authorities increase the risk of 
regulatory failures therefore incapable to exploit the economies of scale and 
scope in a regulatory task intensive opportune information gathering and 
processing and exposed to regulatory forbearance and capture becoming interest 
groups by themselves. In fact becoming each a monopoly over its regulated 
entities, creating monopoly rents by protecting a turf of captive supervisory 
powers incompatible and unsynchronized with each other. Therefore, 
incrementing the regulation cost. 
 
The reform toward a single regulator finds its objectives in obtaining economies 
of scale and scope in the vertical integration of specific unambiguous regulatory 
objectives. In a way similar to the integration of successive monopolies in order 
to avoid double or triple marginalization or monopoly rents over a single 
processes. Economies in the information gathering and processing are guided to 
efficient regulation in an independent institutional framework to avoid regulatory 
failures. The experience in this reform is recent in the cases of Australia, Japan 
and Korea after the UK and Scandinavian experience. 
 
Considering the cost of regulation as a fixed cost o n each domestic financial 
market. An efficient setting would be a low fixed cost relative to a high sized 
financial market. Using indicators from supervisory cost and financial activity size, 
Mexico appears to be the economy with the highest fixed cost in  an 
underdeveloped or small size financial sector relative to the GDP therefore, it 
means a highly inefficient regulatory organization. Urgent supervisory 
institutional scheme reform is required according with international benchmarks. 
 
 